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Evaluation of the Situation of Sixth Army in the
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Evaluation of the Situation
of Sixth Army in the
25 November 1942
by the Commanding General of LI Army Corps
General of Artillery von Seydlitz
form. TOP SECRET
The Commanding General LI Army Corps, November
25, 1942
No. 603/43 g. Kdos.
To : Commander-in-Chief, Sixth Army
Having received Army order of 24.11.1942 on the
continuation of the battle I feel obliged with a
view to the gravity of the hour, to put my
appreciation of the situation which has been
reinforced by the reports of the last 24 hours
down in writing once again.
The Army is faced with a decisive either/or;
break-out to the south-west in the general
direction of Kotelnikovo or destruction within a
few days. This opinion is based on a sober
evaluation of the actual circumstances.
1. Since there is virtually no stock-pile of
supplies at the outset of the battle, the supply
situation is the key factor for any decision.
For the supply situation of LI A.C. as of the
evening of 23.11. see attachment.
The numbers speak for themselves.
Even the minor defensive engagements of the past
few days have noticeably depleted ammunition
stocks. Should the corps be attacked on its full
front, which must be expected daily, then it
will shoot itself completely dry within one or
two days.
It is hardly to be expected that the ammunition
situation is any better with the other army
corps that have already been heavily engaged for
days.
From the calculations made, it is clear that an
adequate supply by air lift of LI Corps alone is
questionable, therefore completely impossible
for the whole army. What 30 Ju (on November 23),
or the further 100 Ju that have only been
promised so far, can bring in, is only a drop.
To attach hopes to this, means grasping at a
straw. Where the large number of Ju required for
the supply of the army is to come from, is
nowhere in evidence. If they exist at all, the
planes will have to be flown in from all over
Europe and
land daily instead of the envisaged 130, they
could only bring in 1000 t of supplies, which
would not suffice to cover the needs of an army
of approx. 200,000 men engaged in heavy combat
and without stockpiles. More than the coverage
of the minimum fuel requirement, a small
fraction of our own ammunition types and maybe
also a fraction of the required food for humans,
cannot be hoped for. The horses will all have
died within a few days. Tactical mobility will
thereby be restricted even further, the
distribution of supplies down to the lines made
more difficult and on the other hand, the fuel
requirement increased.
There can be no doubt that the mass of the
weather-proof Russian fighters will be deployed
for attacks against the incoming cargo planes
and against Pitomnik and Peskovatka, the only
two air bases capable of handling bulk cargo.
Heavy losses are inescapable, continuous fighter
cover over the long distances and for the two
bases far from assured. The weather situation
will also variably influence the tonnage
results.
The impossibility of adequate supply thus
proven, the air lift can only delay the
exhaustion of supplies of the army by a few
days, in the case of ammunition within 3 to 5
days, but not prevent it. Extension of the food
supply lies in our own hands up to a certain
degree (extension by 100% was ordered three days
ago in LI Corps), Extension of fuel and
ammunition stocks depends almost entirely on the
enemy.
2. The probable conduct of the enemy, for whom
victory in a battle of destruction of classic
proportions beckons, is easy to predict. Knowing
his active mode of combat it is hardly to be
questioned that he will continue his attacks
against the encircled Sixth Army with
undiminished force. We must grant him that he
recognises the need to destroy the army before
German relief operations can become effective.
From experience we know that he has no
compunction about sacrificing human lives. Our
successes in containing him, especially on
November 24 and the heavy losses we have seen
him sustain at several points, should not lead
us to self-deception,
The enemy is probably not totally unaware of our
supply problems. The more persistently and
harder he attacks, the more rapidly will we
exhaust our ammunition. Even if no single attack
succeeds, success will come about when the army
has shot itself dry and is defenceless. To
pretend that he does not recognise this would
mean that we expect the enemy to act mistakenly.
In the history of war such an attitude has
always led to defeat. It would be a dangerous
game and if it led to a catastrophe for Sixth
Army, would have the most serious consequences
for the course, and maybe also the result, of
the war.
3. Operationally the conclusion is irrefutable;
if it digs in, Sixth Army can only escape
destruction if relief becomes effective within a
few, i.e., within about 5 days, to such an
extent that the enemy must break off his
attacks. There is not a shred of evidence that
this will happen. Should the relief only become
effective later on, then the condition of
helplessness will inevitably come about, i.e the
destruction of Sixth Army.
What measures the OKH has taken for the relief
of Sixth Army, is not clear. Relief from the
west can only lie at a great distance, because
our own security forces only stand to the
westwards of the upper Chir and from about
Oblivskaya onwards on the lower Chir. Therefore
the deployment of relief forces must take place
at a great distance from Sixth Army. Even with
the aid of the effective rail line via Millerovo,
the deployment of an army powerful enough to
carry out a rapid penetration while
simultaneously securing its northern flank, will
take weeks. To this must be added the time
required for the operation itself which, due to
the inclemencies of the weather and the short
days at this time of the year, will be far
longer than during the summer.
The deployment of 2 Panzer divisions initiated
near Kotelnikovo for relief from the south and
their attack must be calculated as requiring at
least 10 days. The possibilities for a rapid
penetration by the attack are greatly inhibited
by the need to protect the flanks, particularly
the eastern flank, that will grow longer with
each step, leaving aside the unknown condition
the divisions are in and the question whether 2
Panzer divisions are strong enough at all. One
cannot count on the possibility of relief forces
being deployed by means of a larger number of
motorised columns. Neither the vehicles nor the
fuel can be available, otherwise they would
already have had to be made available earlier
and at far lower cost in fuel, to supply the so
greatly exposed
4. The possibility that relief will become
effective within the time dictated by the supply
situation is therefore nil. The OKH's order to
hold the position until relief is here, is
obviously based on unrealistic foundations. It
is therefore impossible to execute and will
invariably lead to catastrophe for the army. If
the army is to be preserved, it must immediately
obtain a different order, or else immediately
take a different decision itself.
With regard to the operational, political and
moral effects, the idea of deliberately
sacrificing the army should be beyond any
consideration.
5. From the comparison of the time scales based
on the supply situation and the operational
requirements, including the probable actions of
the enemy, the conclusion is so clear that
further considerations are hardly required. None
the less, the following factors, all pointing in
the same direction, should be listed :
(a) The western perimeter is still far from
being stabilised.
(b) On the northern front, it is impossible to
contain a sharply concentrated attack by
opposing forces for a longer period of time,
because after first having pulled out 16th
Pz.Div., then 3rd Inf.Div. (mot), the front had
to be withdrawn to a shorter, but almost
completely unprepared line.
(c) Tense situation on the southern front.
(d) Reduced combat strength of the heavily
combed-out
(e) Due to lack of ammunition, prevention of
continuous reinforcement of the enemy
bridgeheads on the
(f) Condition of the divisions, heavily depleted
because of the attacks in
(g) The army compressed in a scanty steppe area
that offers hardly any usable shelters and cover
any longer, so that men and matériel everywhere
exposed to the weather and enemy air attacks.
(h) Expected advent of severe frost with almost
complete lack of firewood on the major part of
the present perimeter lines.
(i)
Only insufficient support by the Luftwaffe due
to lack of favourably situated bases.
In contrast to this, no anti-aircraft
protection, since all anti-aircraft formations
must be exclusively used for anti-tank combat.
A comparison with last year's Demjansk pocket
can lead to dangerously false conclusions. The
distance to the German front was several times
shorter. The supply requirements of one
encircled corps were far less, particularly
since there were far fewer of the weapons
required here in the steppe (tanks, heavy
artillery, mortars) to be supplied. Despite the
short distance to the German front, at the time
the establishment of a very narrow corridor into
the pocket required weeks of heavy winter
fighting.
6. The conclusion is clear.
Either Sixth Army defends itself in the pocket
until it is shot dry, i.e., defenceless. Since,
given continued enemy attacks and their probable
extension to sectors of the front that have been
quiet so far, this condition must occur before
relief can become effective, such passive
conduct means the end of the army.
Or the army acts and breaks open the ring of
encirclement. This is only still possible if the
army makes forces available by withdrawing them
from the northern and Volga fronts, i.e., by
shortening the front, and attacks with them on
the southern front, and then by giving up
Stalingrad breaks out in the direction of the
weakest opposition, i.e., towards Kotelnikovo
This decision requires leaving much matériel
behind, but offers the chance of breaking the
southern jaw of the pincers, withdrawing the
army and its weapon from catastrophe and
preserving it for further operations. By doing
this, a parr of the enemy forces will remain
occupied for the duration, whereas if the army
is destroyed in the pocket, it will cease to
occupy any enemy forces at all. A public
announcement of the event that will not
substantially damage morale is possible. 'After
having completely destroyed the Soviet armament
centre of Stalingrad, the army has withdrawn
from the
The expectation that the break-out will be
successful is all the greater since the fighting
to date has frequently demonstrated a poor
stability of enemy infantry forces in open
ground and as some of our own forces are still
on the tributaries east of the Don and in the
Aksai sector. As regards timing, the breakout
must be initiated and carried out immediately.
Any delay reduces its chances. With every delay
the number of combatants and ammunition is
reduced. With every delay the enemy becomes
stronger on the break-out front and can bring in
further forces of containment against the
Kotelnikovo group. With every delay combat power
is reduced because of loss of horses and
therefore loss of horse-drawn weapons.
If the OKH does not immediately rescind the
order to dig-in, then conscience adamantly
dictates the duty towards the army and the
German nation to seize the freedom of action
denied by the existing orders and to take
advantage of the still existing possibility of
averting catastrophe by our own attack. The
complete destruction of 200,000 combatants and
their
total material is at risk. There is no other
choice.
signed
von Seydlitz
General of Artillery
For the correctness of the copy:
signed. Schatz, Lieutenant
ATTACHMENT TO 603/42 g.K.
Supply situation of LI A.C. as of 23. 1 1.
evening
Ammunition (excl. 3rd mot. Div., 60th mot. Div
and 94th Inf.Div.)
Armour-piercing ammunition approx. 30 - 40%.
Hand-grenades only meagre stocks.
Tracer and signal ammunition only very meagre
stocks.
3rd Inf.Div. (mot), 60th Inf.Div (mot) and 94th
Inf.Div, latter as of 22.11.
stand at:
light field how.
60%
heavy field how.
50%
heavy inf. rounds
25%
light inf. rounds
40%
Daily ammunition requirements of the corps
(based on defensive combat to
date):
(a) 400 t in case of lighter combat (50 t per
div.) = 200 Ju
(b) 800 t in case of heavy combat (100 t per
div.) = 400 Ju
2. Fuel situation
Exact reports from the div. not obtainable.
Stocks as good as exhausted.
The most urgent driving to bring up supplies,
deployment of anti-tank troops, field guns, only
possible for a short while longer,
Daily requirements of the corps under extreme
economies:
80cbm (10 cbm per div.) = 40 Ju
3. Food situation
On average the div. dispose of:
7 full days soft food
4 full days bread
3.5 days flour
We must assume, however, that bakery operations
have ceased because the mass of the bakery
company is deployed in the Karpovka valley.
Daily requirements of the corps (on half
rations)
80 tons soft food = 40 Ju
70 tons tinned food = 35 Ju
Assuming half-rations, the supply of the corps
will require in total :
(a) in case of lighter combat : 598 tons of
supplies = 295 Ju
(b) in case of heavy combat : 990 tons of
supplies = 495 Ju
Signed for the Commander of the Corps
Note :
*Comment by the Chief of Staff of Sixth Army,
Major General Arthur
Schmidt :
'We are not to wrack the Führer's brains for
him, and neither is Gen. v. Seydlitz those of
the Commander in Chief.
Source :
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